NOAM CHOMSKY ON THE
IRAQ WAR
12 April 2003
Noam Chomsky Interviewed
By Michael Albert
Albert:
(1) WHY DID THE
U.S. INVADE IRAQ, IN YOUR
VIEW?
Chomsky:
These are naturally speculations,
and policy makers may
have varying motives.
But we can have a high
degree of confidence about
the answers given by Bush-Powell
and the rest; these cannot
possibly be taken seriously.
They have gone out of
their way to make sure
we understand that, by
a steady dose of self-contradiction
ever since last September
when the war drums began
to beat.
One day the "single
question" is whether
Iraq will disarm; in today's
version (April 12):
"We have high confidence
that they have weapons
of mass destruction --
that is what this war
was about and is about."
That was the pretext throughout
the whole UN-disarmament
farce, though it was never
easy to take seriously;
UNMOVIC was doing a good
job in virtually disarming
Iraq, and could
have continued, if that
were the goal. But there
is no need to discuss
it, because after stating
solemnly that this is
the "single question,"
they went on the next
day to announce that it
wasn't the goal at all:
even if there isn't a
pocket knife anywhere
in Iraq, the US will invade
anyway, because it is
committed to "regime
change."
The next day we hear that
there's nothing to that
either; thus at the Azores
summit, where Bush-Blair
issued their ultimatum
to the UN, they made it
clear that they would
invade even if Saddam
and his gang left the
country. So "regime
change" is not enough.
The next day we hear that
the goal is "democracy"
in the world. Pretexts
range over the lot, depending
on audience and circumstances,
which means that no sane
person can take the charade
seriously.
The one constant is that
the US must end up in
control of Iraq. Saddam
Hussein was authorized
to suppress, brutally,
a 1991 uprising that might
have overthrown him because
"the best of all
worlds" for Washington
would be "an iron-fisted
Iraqi junta without Saddam
Hussein" (by then
an embarrassment), which
would rule the country
with an "iron fist"
as Saddam had done with
US support and approval
(NYT chief diplomatic
correspondent Thomas Friedman).
The uprising would have
left the country in the
hands of Iraqis who might
not have subordinated
themselves sufficiently
to Washington. The murderous
sanctions regime of the
following years devastated
the society, strengthened
the tyrant, and compelled
the population to rely
for survival on his (highly
efficient) system for
distributing basic goods.
The sanctions thus undercut
the possibility of the
kind of popular revolt
that had overthrown an
impressive series of other
monsters who had been
strongly supported by
the current incumbents
in Washington up to the
very end of their bloody
rule: Marcos, Duvalier,
Ceausescu, Mobutu, Suharto,
and a long list of others,
some of them easily as
tyrannical and barbaric
as Saddam.
Had it not been for the
sanctions, Saddam probably
would have gone the same
way, as has been pointed
out for years by the Westerners
who know Iraq best, Denis
Halliday and Hans van
Sponeck (though one has
to go to Canada, England,
or elsewhere to find their
writings). But overthrow
of the regime from within
would not be acceptable
either, because it would
leave Iraqis in charge.
The Azores summit merely
reiterated that stand.
The question of who rules
Iraq remains the prime
issue of contention.
The US-backed opposition
demands that the UN play
a vital role in post-war
Iraq and rejects US control
of reconstruction or government
(Leith Kubba, one of the
most respected secular
voices in the West, connected
with the National Endowment
of Democracy). One of
the leading Shi'ite opposition
figures, Sayed Muhamed
Baqer al-Hakim, who heads
the Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SCIRI), just informed
the press that "we
understand this war to
be about imposing US hegemony
over Iraq," and perceive
the US as "an occupying
rather than a liberating
force." He stressed
that the UN must supervise
elections,
and called on "foreign
troops to withdraw from
Iraq" and leave Iraqis
in charge.
US policy-makers have
a radically different
conception. They must
imposea client regime
in Iraq, following the
practice elsewhere in
the region, and most significantly,
in the regions that have
been under US domination
for a century, Central
America and the Caribbean.
That too is well-understood.
Brent Scowcroft, National
Security Adviser to Bush
I, just repeated the obvious:
"What's going to
happen the first time
we hold an election in
Iraq and it turns out
the radicals win? What
do you do? We're surely
not going to let them
take over."
The same holds throughout
the region. Recent studies
reveal that from Morocco
to Lebanon to the Gulf,
about 95% of the population
want a greater role in
government for Islamic
religious figures, and
the same percentage believe
that the sole US interest
in the region is to control
its oil and
strengthen Israel. Antagonism
to Washington has reached
unprecedented heights,
and the idea that Washington
would institute a radical
change in policy and tolerate
truly democratic elections,
respecting the outcome,
seems rather fanciful,
to say the least.
Turning to the question,
one reason for the invasion,
surely, is to gain control
over the world's second
largest oil reserves,
which will place the US
in an even more powerful
position of global domination,
maintaining "a stranglehold
on the global economy,"
as Michael Klare describes
the long-term objective,
which he regards as the
primary motive for war.
However, this cannot explain
the timing. Why now?
The drumbeat for war began
in September 2002, and
the government-media propaganda
campaign achieved a spectacular
success. Very quickly,
the majority of the population
came to believe that Iraq
posed an imminent threat
to US security, even that
Iraq was involved in 9-11
(up from 3% after 9-11)
and was planning new attacks.
Not surprisingly, these
beliefs correlated closely
with support for the planned
war. The beliefs are unique
to the US. Even in Kuwait
and Iran, which were invaded
by Saddam Hussein, he
was not feared, though
he was despised. They
know perfectly well that
Iraq was the weakest state
in the region, and for
years they had joined
others in trying to reintegrate
Iraq into the regional
system, over strong US
objections. But a highly
effective propaganda assault
drove the American population
far off the spectrum of
world opinion, a remarkable
achievement.
The September propaganda
assault coincided with
two important events.
One was the opening of
the mid-term election
campaign. Karl Rove, the
administration's campaign
manager, had already pointed
out that Republicans have
to "go to the country"
on the issue of national
security, because voters
"trust the Republican
Party to do a better job
of...protecting America."
One didn't have to be
a political genius to
realize that if social
and economic issues dominated
the election, the Bush
administration did not
have a chance. Accordingly,
it was necessary to concoct
a huge threat to our survival,
which the powerful leader
will manage to overcome,
miraculously. For the
elections, the strategy
barely worked. Polls reveal
that voters maintained
their preferences, but
suppressed concerns over
jobs, pensions, benefits,
etc., in favor of security.
Something similar will
be needed for the presidential
campaign.
All of this is second
nature for the current
incumbents.
They are mostly recycled
from the more reactionary
sectors of the Reagan-Bush
administrations, and know
that they were able to
run the country for 12
years, carrying out domestic
programs that the public
largely opposed, by pushing
the panic button regularly:
Libyan attempting to "expel
us from the world"
(Reagan), an air base
in Grenada from which
the Russians would bomb
us, Nicaragua only "two-days
driving time from Harlingen
Texas," waving their
copies of Mein Kampf as
they planned to take over
the hemisphere, black
criminals about to rape
your sister (Willie Horton,
the 1988 presidential
campaign), Hispanic narcotraffickers
about to destroy us, and
on and on.
To maintain political
power is an extremely
important matter if the
narrow sectors of power
represented by the Bush
administration hope to
carry out their reactionary
domestic program over
strong popular opposition,
if possible even to institutionalize
them, so it will be hard
to reconstruct what is
being dismantled.
Something else happened
in September 2002: the
administration released
its National Security
Strategy, sending many
shudders around the world,
including the US foreign
policy elite. The Strategy
has many precedents, but
does break new ground:
for the first time in
the post-war world, a
powerful state announced,
loud and clear, that it
intends to rule the world
by force, forever, crushing
any potential challenge
it might perceive.
This is often called in
the press a doctrine of
"pre-emptive war."
That is crucially wrong;
it goes vastly beyond
pre-emption. Sometimes
it is called more accurately
a doctrine of "preventive
war." That too understates
the doctrine. No military
threat, however remote,
need be "prevented";
challenges can be concocted
at will, and may not involve
any threat other than
"defiance";
those who pay attention
to history know that "successful
defiance" has often
been taken to be justification
for resort to force in
the past.
When a doctrine is announced,
some action must be taken
to demonstrate that it
is seriously intended,
so that it can become
a new "norm in international
relations," as commentators
will soberly explain.
What is needed is a war
with an "exemplary
quality," Harvard
Middle East historian
Roger Owen pointed out,
discussing the reasons
for the attack on Iraq.
The exemplary action teaches
a lesson that others must
heed, or else.
Why Iraq? The experimental
subject must have several
important qualities. It
must be defenseless, and
it must be important;
there's no point illustrating
the doctrine by invading
Burundi. Iraq qualified
perfectly in both respects.
The importance is obvious,
and so is the required
weakness.
Iraq was not much of a
military force to begin
with, and had been largely
disarmed through the 1990s
while much of the society
was driven to the edge
of survival. Its military
expenditures and economy
were about one-third those
of Kuwait, with 10% of
its population, far below
others in the region,
and of course the regional
superpower, Israel, by
now virtually an offshore
military base of the US.
The invading force not
only had utterly overwhelming
military power, but also
extensive information
to guide its actions from
satellite observation
and overflights for many
years, and more recently
U-2 flights on the pretext
of disarmament, surely
sending data directly
back to Washington.
Iraq was therefore a perfect
choice for an "exemplary
action" to establish
the new doctrine of global
rule by force as a "norm
of international relations."
A high official involved
in drafting the National
Security Strategy informed
the press that its publication
"was the signal that
Iraq would be the first
test, but not the last."
"Iraq became the
petri dish
in which this experiment
in pre-emptive policy
grew," the New York
Times reported -- misstating
the policy in the usual
way, but otherwise accurate.
All of these factors gave
good reasons for war.
And they also help explain
why the planned war was
so overwhelmingly opposed
by the public worldwide
(including the US, particularly
when we extract the factor
of fear, unique to the
US). And also strongly
opposed by a substantial
part of economic and foreign
policy elites, a very
unusual development. They
rightly fear that the
adventurist posture may
prove very costly to their
own interests, even to
survival. It is well-understood
that these policies are
driving others to develop
a deterrent, which could
be weapons of mass destruction,
or credible threats of
serious terror, or even
conventional weapons,
as in the case of North
Korea, with artillery
massed to destroy Seoul.
With any remnants of some
functioning system oworld
order torn to shreds,
the Bush administration
is instructing the world
that nothing matters but
force -- and they hold
the mailed fist, though
others are not likely
to tolerate that for long.
Including, one hopes,
the American people, who
are in by far the best
position to counter and
reverse these extremely
ominous trends.
Albert:
(2) THERE IS SOME
CHEERING IN THE STREETS
OF IRAQI CITIES. DOES
THIS RETROSPECTIVELY UNDERCUT
THE LOGIC OF ANTIWAR OPPOSITION?
Chomsky:
I'm surprised that it
was so limited and so
long delayed. Every sensible
person should welcome
the overthrow of the tyrant,
and the ending of the
devastating sanctions,
most certainly Iraqis.
But the antiwar opposition,
at least the part of it
I know anything about,
was always in favor of
these ends. That's why
it opposed the sanctions
that were destroying the
country and undermining
the possibility of an
internal revolt that would
send Saddam the way of
the other brutal killers
supported by the present
incumbents in Washington.
The antiwar movement insisted
that Iraqis, not the US
government, must run the
country. And it still
does -- or should; it
can have a substantial
impact in this regard.
Opponents of the war were
also rightly appalled
by the utter lack of concern
for the possible humanitarian
consequences of the attack,
and by the ominous strategy
for which it was the "test
case." The basic
issues remain:
(1) Who will run Iraq,
Iraqis or a clique in
Crawford Texas?
(2) Will the American
people permit the narrow
reactionary sectors that
barely hold on to political
power to implement their
domestic and international
agendas?
Albert:
(3) THERE HAS BEEN
NO W.M.D. FOUND? D0ES
THIS RETROSPECTIVELY UNDERCUT
BUSH'S RATIONALE FOR WAR?
Chomsky:
Only if one takes the
rationale seriously. The
leadership still pretends
to, as Fleischer's current
remarks illustrate. If
they can find something,
which is not unlikely,
that will be trumpeted
as justification for the
war.
If they can't, the whole
issue will be "disappeared"
in the usual fashion.
Albert:
(4) IF W.M.D. ARE
NOW FOUND, AND VERIFIED,
WOULD THAT RETROSPECTIVELY
UNDERCUT ANTIWAR OPPOSITION?
Chomsky:
That's a logical impossibility.
Policies and opinions
about them are determined
by what is known or plausibly
believed, not by what
is discovered afterwards.
That should be elementary.
Albert:
(5) WILL THERE BE
DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ, AS
A RESULT OF THIS INVASION?
Chomsky:
Depends on what one means
by "democracy."
I presume the Bush PR
team will want to put
into place some kind of
formal democracy, as long
as it has no substance.
But it's hard to imagine
that they would allow
a real voice to the Shi'ite
majority, which is likely
to join the rest of the
region in trying to establish
closer relations with
Iran, the last thing the
Bushites want. Or that
they would allow a real
voice to the next largest
component of the population,
the Kurds, who are likely
to seek some kind of autonomy
within a federal structure
that would be anathema
to Turkey, a major base
for US power in the region.
One should not be misled
by the recent hysterical
reaction to the crime
of the Turkish government
in adopting the position
of 95% of its population,
another indication of
the passionate hatred
of democracy in elite
circles here, and another
reason why no sensible
person can take the rhetoric
seriously. Same throughout
the region. Functioning
democracy would have outcomes
that are inconsistent
with the goal of US hegemony,
just as in our own "backyard"
over a century.
Albert:
(6) WHAT MESSAGE
HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY GOVERNMENTS
AROUND THE WORLD, WITH
WHAT LIKELY BROAD IMPLICATIONS?
Chomsky:
The message is that the
Bush administration intends
its National Security
Strategy to be taken seriously,
as the "test case"
illustrates. It intends
to dominate the world
by force, the one dimension
in which it rules supreme,
and to do so permanently.
A more specific message,
illustrated dramatically
by the Iraq-North Korea
case, is that if you want
to fend off a US attack,
you had better have a
credible deterrent. It's
widely assumed in elite
circles that the likely
consequence is proliferation
of WMD and terror, in
various forms, based on
fear and loathing for
the US administration,
which was regarded as
the greatest threat to
world peace even before
the invasion. That's no
small matter these days.
Questions of peace shade
quickly into questions
of survival for the species,
given the case of means
of violence.
Albert:
(7) WHAT WAS THE
ROLE OF THE AMERICAN MEDIA
ESTABLISHMENT IN PAVING
THE WAY FOR THIS WAR,
AND THEN RATIONALIZING
IT, NARROWING THE TERMS
OF DISCUSSION ETC.?
Chomsky:
The media uncritically
relayed government propaganda
about the threat to US
security posed by Iraq,
its involvement in 9-11
and other terror, etc.
Some amplified the message
on their own. Others simply
relayed it. The effects
in the polls were striking,
as often before. Discussion
was, as usual, restricted
to "pragmatic grounds":
will the US government
get away with its plans
at a cost acceptable at
home. Once the war began
it became a shameful exercise
of cheering for the home
team, appalling much of
the world.
Albert:
(8) WHAT IS NEXT
ON THE AGENDA, BROADLY,
FOR BUSH AND CO., IF THEY
ARE ABLE TO PURSUE THEIR
PREFERRED AGENDAS?
Chomsky:
They have publicly announced
that the next targets
could be Syria and Iran
-- which would require
a strong military base
in Iraq, presumably; another
reason why any meaningful
democracy is unlikely.
It has been reliably reported
for some time that the
US and its allies (Turkey,
Israel, and some others)
have been taking steps
towards dismemberment
of Iran. But there are
other possible targets
too. The Andean region
qualifies. It has very
substantial resources,
including oil. It is in
turmoil, with dangerous
independent popular movements
that are not under control.
It is by now surrounded
by US military bases with
US forces already on the
ground. And one can think
of others.
Albert:
(9) WHAT OBSTACLES
NOW STAND OM THE WAY OF
BNUSH AND CO'S DOING AS
THEY PREFER,AND WHAT OBSTACLES
MIGHT ARISE?
Chomsky:
The prime obstacle is
domestic. But that's up
to us.
Albert:
(10) WHAT HGAS BEEN
YOUR IMPRESSION OF THE
ANTIWAR OPPOSITON AND
WHAT OUGHT TO BE ITS AGENDA
NOW?
Chomsky:
Antiwar opposition here
has been completely without
precedent in scale and
commitment, something
we've discussed before,
and that is certainly
obvious to anyone who
has had any experience
in these matters here
for the past 40 years.
Its agenda right now,
I think, should be to
work to ensure that Iraq
is run by Iraqis, that
the US provide massive
reparations for what it
has done to Iraq for 20
years (by supporting Saddam
Hussein, by wars, by brutal
sanctions which probably
caused a great deal more
damage and deaths than
the wars); and if that
is too much honesty to
expect, then at least
massive aid, to be used
by Iraqis, as they decide,
which well be something
other than US taxpayer
subsidies to Halliburton
and Bechtel. Also high
on the agenda should be
putting a brake on the
extremely dangerous policies
announced in the Security
Strategy, and carried
out in the "petri
dish." And related
to that, there should
be serious efforts to
block the bonanza of arms
sales that is happily
anticipated as a consequence
of the war, which will
also contribute to making
the world a more awful
and dangerous place. But
that's only the beginning.
The antiwar movement is
indissolubly linked to
the global justice movements,
which have much more far-reaching
goals, properly.
Albert:
(11) WHAT DO YOU
THINK IS THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE INVASION OF
IRAQ AND CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION,
AND WHAT SHOULD BE THE
RELATION BETWEEN THE ANTICORPORATE
GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT,
AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT?
Chomsky:
The invasion of Iraq was
strongly opposed by the
main centers of corporate
globalization. At the
World Economic Forum in
Davos in January, opposition
was so strong that Powell
was practically shouted
down when he tried to
present a case for the
war -- announcing, pretty
clearly, that the US would
"lead" even
if no one followed, except
for the pathetic Blair.
The global justice and
peace movements are so
closely linked in their
objectives that there
is nothing much to say.
We should, however, recall
that the planners do draw
these links, as we should
too, in our own different
way. They predict that
their version of "globalization"
will proceed on course,
leading to "chronic
financial volatility"
(meaning still slower
growth, harming mostly
the poor) "and a
widening economic divide"
(meaning less globalization
in the technical sense
of convergence). They
predict further that "deepening
economic stagnation, political
instability, and cultural
alienation will foster
ethnic, ideological and
religious extremism, along
with violence," much
of it directed against
the US -- that is, more
terror. Military planners
make the same assumptions.
That is a good part of
the rationale for rapidly
increasing military spending,
including the plans for
militarization of space
that the entire world
is trying to block, without
much hope as long as the
matter is kept from the
sight of Americans, who
have the prime responsibility
to stop it. I presume
that is why some of the
major events of last October
were not even reported,
among them the US vote
at the UN, alone (with
Israel), against a resolution
calling for reaffirmation
of a 1925 Geneva convention
banning biological weapons
and another resolution
strengthening the 1967
Outer Space Treaty to
ban use of space for military
purposes, including offensive
weapons that may well
do us all in. The agenda,
as always, begins with
trying to find out what
is happening in the world,
and then doing something
about it, as we can, better
than anyone else. Few
share our privilege, power,
and freedom -- hence responsibility.
That should be another
truism.
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